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Is Kant a conceptualist or a nonconceptualist? Very roughly, this amounts to the following
question: Do intuitions depend on concepts in order to represent objects? Much recent Kant
scholarship is devoted to answering this question, which is of interest not only for its
connection to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and perception, but also
because the answer one provides has important implications for how one understands
crucial features of Kant’s account of cognition.
While conceptualism was for some time the default interpretation of Kant, this is no longer
the case. In fact, one now finds a number of competing nonconceptualist interpretations of
intuition, and conceptualists have in turn divided in their characterisations of the way in
which intuitions depend on concepts in order to represent objects. As Lucy Allais notes in
her contribution, an important result of this recent debate is “lively dispute and clarification
of key terms in Kant’s philosophy, such as intuition, sensation, perception, cognition, and
synthesis” (p. 2). The essays in this volume continue in this vein. Engaging with them has
certainly helped me to clarify my own understanding of key features of Kant’s account of
cognition, including his account of space and spatial representation; his precise strategy in
the second-half of the B-Deduction; and the nature and role of intuitions.
In this review, I’d like to focus on the way in which authors in this volume approach the
following three questions: (1) Is the unity of the pure intuition of space as an all-
encompassing whole independent of the understanding, and if so, what follows with
respect to the unity of empirical intuitions? (2) When Kant says that all objects of the senses
stand under the categories, does this mean that the categories (and concepts more
generally) play a role in generating intuitions, or is there a way of understanding this claim
that is compatible with nonconceptualism (according to which intuitions do not depend on
concepts in order to be intuitions)? And finally, (3) Are intuitions representational or
relational states and what implications does this have for how we understand the role of
intuitions in establishing real possibility?
1. The Unity of Space
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In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that our original representations of space and
time are not concepts, but a priori intuitions (A25/B39–40; A32/B48). In §26 of the B-
Deduction, however, Kant argues that the unity of space and time “as intuitions themselves”
depends on the understanding (B160–1). In a footnote to this passage, Kant distinguishes
between mere forms of intuition and formal intuitions, where the latter involve a “unity of
[…] representation” that “presupposes a synthesis” (B 160–1n). Conceptualists take these
remarks to show that the understanding is involved in generating the unity of our pure
forms of intuition in virtue of which they count as formal intuitions. At the same time, a
number of scholars have argued that the unity of space and time as all-encompassing and
infinite wholes cannot be a product of conceptually guided synthesis.  In particular, they
argue that because synthesis is an activity that always proceeds from part-to-whole to
produce representations of determinate spaces and times, it cannot explain the unity of
space, which is the unity of an infinite whole that precedes its parts.
In ‘The Difference Between Original, Metaphysical and Geometrical Representations of
Space’ (Chapter 11 in the volume), Clinton Tolley offers a helpful taxonomy for discussing
the unity of space. The original representation of space is what is given to the subject prior to
any determination; metaphysical space is the representation of this space by the
metaphysician, who is concerned with articulating what belongs to our concept of the
original intuition of space (viz., that it is an infinite, given magnitude); and general concepts
of space result from the delimitation of the originally given space and belong to the
geometrical representation of space (p. 265). The metaphysical and geometrical
representations, while they are derived from the original representation of space, require
the understanding. In the case of the geometrical representation of space, the
understanding is required because it is via the act of construction that we delimit space. As
we shall see in what follows, conceptualists and nonconceptualists alike go astray in failing
adequately to distinguish between these different ways of representing space.
This is not taxonomy for taxonomy’s sake; Tolley wants to deploy these distinctions to
respond to the conceptualist interpretation of §26, among other passages from the
Transcendental Deduction. According to Tolley, the B160–1 footnote is not concerned with
the unity of our original representation of space, but rather with the unity that belongs to
the representations of this space in geometry (p. 283). The footnote, in other words, does
not challenge the claim that the content of intuition is nonconceptual; it merely points out
that the conceptual representation of space—when we construct concepts in intuition—
depends on the understanding.
More generally, Tolley wants to draw a distinction between that what belongs to intuition
(pure and empirical), which does not depend on the understanding, and the representation
of that which belongs to intuition, which depends on intellectual conditions of the
understanding. As Tolley reads the Transcendental Deduction, Kant is “shifting his target
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from what is constitutive of a representation (intuition) per se to what is required for the
representation of  (certain features of) a representation” (p. 281). That is, in order to become
conscious of these features of intuition, the understanding is required.
We ought, however, to separate Tolley’s taxonomy from the use to which he puts it in
interpreting the Transcendental Deduction. The problem is that his strategy for
accommodating Kant’s arguments in the Deduction does not accord with Kant’s account of
geometry.
It seems to follow from Tolley’s distinction (between intuition and what is required for the
representation of intuition) that what we are doing when we form geometrical concepts is
becoming conscious of the features that are already present in our (original) intuition of
space. But, while it is certainly right that the original representation of space is the ground
of geometrical constructions, Kant is explicit in the Prolegomena that the laws of geometry
are equally grounded in the understanding insofar as it determines space. Consider the
following passage, which I quote at length given its importance for my discussion in this, as
well as in the next, section:
Here then is nature that rests on laws that the understanding cognizes a priori, and indeed chiefly
from universal principles of the determination of space. Now I ask: do these laws of nature lie in
space, and does the understanding learn them in that it merely seeks to investigate the wealth of
meaning that lies in space, or do they lie in the understanding and the way in which it determines
space in accordance with the conditions of the synthetic unity toward which its concepts are one and
all directed? Space is something so uniform, and so indeterminate with respect to all specific
properties, that certainly no one will look for a stock of natural laws within it. By contrast, that
which determines space into the figure of a circle, a cone, or a sphere is the understanding, insofar
as it contains the basis for the unity of the construction of these figures. The mere universal form of
intuition called space is therefore certainly the substratum of all intuitions determinable upon
particular objects, and, admittedly, the condition for the possibility and variety of these intuitions
lies in this space; but the unity of the objects is determined solely through the understanding. (Prol,
AA 4:321–2).
What I take from this passage is that the role of the understanding in geometry is not a
matter of bringing to consciousness a unity that already belongs to intuition per se (to
borrow Tolley’s phrase), but of first constituting the relevant unity. Notice that what secures
geometrical laws is the fact that “the unity of the objects is determined solely through the
understanding”. This point has important implications for Kant’s account of empirical
intuition. Even if we grant that the original representation of space has a unity that does not
depend on the understanding, it does not follow, as Tolley seems to think, that empirical
intuitions have a unity that is independent of the understanding, precisely because
determinate spaces (to which the laws of geometry must apply) are the form of empirical
intuitions. In their contributions to the volume, Stefanie Grüne and Thomas Land both use
this point to argue for moderate forms of conceptualism (Grüne prefers the term “modified
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Intellectualism”).
In ‘Sensible Synthesis and the Intuition of Space’ (Chapter 4), Grüne begins by reconstructing
and evaluating Colin McLear’s mereological argument for the thesis that pure intuitions
have a distinct kind of unity that cannot be a product of any act of synthesis. McLear (2015)
argues that the unity of the pure intuitions of space and time cannot be a product of any act
of synthesis because this unity has whole-part priority and synthesis can only produce
representations with part-whole priority. But as Grüne shows, McLear does not
disambiguate between two senses of ‘pure intuition’: that which refers to the pure intuitions
of space and time as all-encompassing wholes, and that which refers to the pure intuitions
of determinate spatial regions and temporal intervals. McLear’s argument, if successful, only
establishes the independent unity of pure intuitions in the former sense, but not the latter.
On Grüne’s modified Intellectualist interpretation, the pure intuitions of space and time as
singular infinite wholes are independent of the understanding, but the pure intuitions of
finite spaces and times—which are the form of empirical intuitions—depend on sensible
synthesis. According to Grüne, “the function of sensible synthesis is to make the object of a
complex sensible representation phenomenally present to the subject and thereby to
generate an intuition” (p. 88). She then argues that it is because the pure intuitions of space
and time as infinite wholes are not phenomenally present to the subject that they do not
require sensible synthesis. We do not perceive or imagine infinite space; instead, what is
phenomenally present to us is a property of finite (i.e. determinate) spaces, “the property of
being part of the all-encompassing space” (p. 95).
This strikes me as getting the dependence relation between space and finite spaces the
wrong way round. Finite spaces are not given parts of space, but delimitations of an infinite
given space. It is hard to see, moreover, how we can arrive at the latter by starting from the
perspective of the former. In what sense is the property of belonging to an all-
encompassing space (or time) present to us when representing finite spaces? We certainly
experience a given region of space as bounded by a larger region of space, but this is not
the same as representing it as belonging to a singular, infinite, and all-encompassing space.
Grüne is concerned with avoiding the criticism that her modified Intellectualism is ad hoc,
but I think a better strategy for responding to this objection is to focus on the requirements
for representing determinate magnitudes (rather than with what is and isn’t phenomenally
present).
It is precisely consideration of determinate magnitudes that leads Thomas Land, in
‘Moderate Conceptualism and Spatial Representation’ (Chapter 7), to argue that Kant’s
theory of spatial representation implies a moderate form of conceptualism. For Land, the
function of sensible synthesis is to generate intuitions (both pure and empirical) of
determinate magnitudes. To support this interpretation, he appeals to the argument in the
Axioms of Intuition that the “same synthesis” that generates the representation of
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determinate magnitudes is involved in the apprehension of appearances in empirical
intuition (B202–3). This is only “moderate” conceptualism, because although sensible
synthesis is an act of spontaneity, it is not an act of judgement. Two main features of
sensible synthesis distinguish it from judgement: (1) unlike judgment, sensible synthesis
involves a successive synthesis of a manifold; and (2) unlike judgement (which has a
predicative structure) sensible synthesis has a spatio-temporal structure.
I think Land is right to distinguish between sensible synthesis and judgement along these
lines, and also right that sensible synthesis is involved in the representation of determinate
magnitudes in empirical intuition. But this is not the only, or even main, point of his
contribution. He is primarily concerned with responding to the objection that moderate
conceptualism cannot account for the holistic character of spatial representation, but is
instead committed to “sense-atomism”, the view that synthesis produces the representation
of objects out of atomic sensations that otherwise lack determinate relation to each other.
Land claims, however, that although sensible synthesis proceeds from part to whole, this is
compatible with “the holistic character of spatial representation” (p. 168). The holistic unity
of space is a feature that arises from the nature of space as a pure form of intuition, but
only as a potentiality. This potentiality must be actualised through the a priori determination
of sensibility by the productive imagination (through the act of figurative synthesis).
Because this a priori actualisation of sensibility is a condition of empirical intuitions,
“sensations will be just as holistic as the spatiotemporal form of the capacity whose
actualisations they are” (p. 162).
But, as Land himself argues, the figurative synthesis that is a condition for the apprehension
of an object in empirical intuition is the synthesis that produces the representation of a
determinate magnitude. The problem is that this kind of synthesis cannot explain the unity
that belongs to space and time as infinite and all-encompassing wholes. Or, at the least,
Land would need to explain what the relationship is between the kind of figurative synthesis
that produces the representation of determinate magnitudes in geometry (and in empirical
intuition) and the act of the productive imagination that actualises the representation of
space and time themselves as infinite wholes.
Despite this worry, an important point that Land makes with respect to the discussion of
actualisation is that although the understanding (via the imagination) plays a role in
actualising sensible representations, this does not mean that the content of these
representations is conceptual. For example, we need the understanding in order to
represent empirical intuitions as determinate magnitudes (magnitudes that are built up
from their parts), but because these intuitions are sensible representations that inherit
features from the pure forms of sensibility, they are also continuous magnitudes. That is, we
need not be committed to the claim that sensibility operates independently of the
understanding in order to acknowledge that sensibility contributes distinct representational
content to cognition.
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Robert Hanna would likely challenge that latter claim. In ‘Directions in Space, Nonconceptual
Form and the Foundations of Transcendental Idealism’ (Chapter 5), Hanna appeals to Kant’s
discussion of incongruent counterparts (which traces to the 1768 ‘Directions in Space’ essay)
to argue for a non-intellectualist version of transcendental idealism, according to which
appearances necessarily conform to space and time, but not to the categories. According to
Hanna, incongruent counterparts, especially as perceived by non-rational animals, are
“rogue objects”, that is, objects that necessarily fall outside the categories. Because Kant’s
goal in the B-Deduction is to show that “the categories are necessarily applicable to all
appearances,” the existence of such rogue objects shows that Kant’s argument is unsound
(p. 114).
As I see it, however, there is a difference between attributing to non-rational animals a
primitive feeling of the difference between the sides of their bodies and attributing to them
the ability to cognise incongruent counterparts. Furthermore, the existence of the former
ability is only incompatible with Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction if one
assumes a strongly conceptualist interpretation of the Deduction, that is, if one takes Kant
to argue that the categories are conditions of appearances themselves. If we reject that
interpretation, as other authors in the volume suggest, then nonconceptualism need not
threaten the goal of the Transcendental Deduction.
2. Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction
The B-Deduction is usually considered to provide the strongest support for
the conceptualist interpretation of intuitions. It is here, after all, that Kant writes, “all
synthesis, through which perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories”
(B161). Many conceptualists have taken this to mean that the categories are involved in the
production or generation of intuitions themselves, and moreover, that it is because the
categories play this role that we can establish a priori that the categories necessarily apply
to any object of intuition. Unlike Hanna, most nonconceptualists do not want to accept this
characterisation of Kant’s argument. In this section, I evaluate some of the different
strategies presented in this volume for reconciling nonconceptualism with the
Transcendental Deduction.
The strategy employed by Dennis Schulting, Lucy Allais, and, as we have already seen,
Clinton Tolley, is to argue that the categories are not constitutive of intuitions—they do not
produce or generate them—instead, they are epistemic conditions of intuition (Schulting, p
254). That is, in order to represent or cognise that intuitions have certain features or
properties, we must employ the categories, but prior to this employment, intuitions already
have these features.
In ‘On an Older Dispute: Hegel, Pippin, and the Separability of Concept and Intuition in Kant’
(Chapter 10), Schulting employs this distinction to criticise Robert Pippin’s Hegelian
interpretation of the Deduction. Hegel famously interpreted the B-Deduction as the place
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where Kant himself paved the way for overcoming the duality of sensibility and
understanding. On Pippin’s reading of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant overcomes the
duality of the faculties by arguing that the categories are conditions of anything being given
in sensibility at all. Schulting grants to Pippin that the categories are conditions for anything
being given, but only in an epistemic sense. That is, he grants that the thinking subject must
apply the categories to sensible content in order to grasp this content as the sensible
content of thought. But, for Schulting, it is a mistake to conclude from this that the
categories themselves constitute or generate this content. Because the categories are only
epistemic, and not constitutive, conditions of intuition, we can maintain Kant’s distinction
between the faculties of sensibility and understanding, rather than taking Kant to collapse
this distinction in the B-Deduction.
The focus on epistemic conditions is likewise central to Lucy Allais’ strategy for reconciling
nonconceptualism with the Transcendental Deduction.  In ‘Conceptualism and
Nonconceptualism in Kant: A Survey of the Recent Debate’ (Chapter 1), she writes:
[T]he argument of TD is not concerned with what is necessary for intuitions to be intuitions (to be
unified in the way that is necessary for them to be singular and immediate representations that give
us objects), but for intuitions to be unified in the different way that is necessary for them to be
cognized—for them to be grasped as objects using concepts and to have concepts applied to them.
(p. 19–20).
For Allais, empirical intuitions already present us with sensible particulars prior to any
conceptual determination. Elsewhere, she defines a particular as a “spatially continuous and
unified individual[] existing outside the subject and located in space” (2009:405). In order to
grasp these particulars as objects, that is, as unified complexes of properties, we must
employ the categories.
I share Sacha Golob’s concern with this strategy. The problem is that this kind of move
renders Kant’s argument vulnerable to the criticism that it only shows that the subject must
apply the categories in order to think about objects, but not that the categories must apply
to these objects. Golob cites Anil Gomes (2010, 2014), who argues that to avoid this criticism,
we must read Kant’s argument in the second-half of the B-Deduction as showing that the
categories are not just conditions on our thought about objects, but play some role in the
constitution of these objects.
In order to meet this constraint, Golob suggests a different strategy. In ‘Why the
Transcendental Deduction is Compatible with Nonconceptualism’ (Chapter 2), Golob argues
that the categories are “a necessary condition on and only on the representation of a certain
privileged class of spatial or temporal relations” (p. 38). He has two kinds of relation in mind:
(1) the representation of composition (i.e. representing something as a whole that is built up




On this view, the categories are not just conditions for making judgements, but also
conditions for certain kinds of sensible representation of objects. This is still a version of
nonconceptualism, because categorial synthesis is not a condition for having empirical
intuitions (understood as representations of spatiotemporal particulars), but only for
sensibly representing certain complex relations among intuitions (e.g. relations of
composition or objective succession).
While this is a promising strategy, Golob’s version of it may collapse into the previous
strategy (in particular, Lucy Allais’ version as presented by Golob). Golob criticises Allais,
because for her, the categories are just conditions for the application of concepts to objects
in judgement, and he thinks this cannot accommodate the second-step of the B-Deduction.
In order for his view to be different, it must be the case that the categories are a condition
for the sensible representation themselves. But if that is so, then it won’t be the case that a
non-human animal that lacks the categories can sensibly represent—in this case, see—these
relations. Yet Golob claims that on Kant’s view, “an animal can indeed see a line at a glance”
but it cannot “represent mereological relations between the whole and its parts” (p. 41). But,
if that is the case, then it sounds like the latter representation is simply the judgement that
the line (segment) is a whole built up out of its parts.
It is worth thinking about why Kant thinks that synthesis is required to represent relations of
composition and succession. At the beginning of his discussion of the synthesis of
apprehension in the A-Deduction, Kant writes:
Wherever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of external things or as the
effect of inner causes, whether they have originated a priori or empirically as appearances—as
modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense, and as such all of our cognitions
are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they
must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. (A98–9)
The thought here is that in apprehension we do not just take in the relations that were
already present in intuition prior to any synthesis, but instead, we introduce the very
relations into intuition insofar as we connect the manifold in inner sense.
Here, we arrive at the crux of the debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists.
Conceptualists think that synthesis is required to generate the unity of the manifold in virtue
of which intuitions represent objects to the perceiving subject at all. They would deny that
on Kant’s account the animal sees a line but cannot represent it as such. The animal, after
all, might be given something we might want to call parts of the line, but if the animal cannot
reproduce the parts of the line in its inner sense, then it does not see the line.
In fact, this is not just a matter of reproduction. Lines, for Kant, are produced via the motion
of a point (that is, through the subject’s description of space). I think that Kant could grant
that a non-human animal can detect things like edges, but this is not the same as seeing a
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line. This brings me back to the long passage from the Prolegomena that I cited in the
previous section. Kant thinks that the lawfulness of geometry is secured because the unity
of spatial constructions is a result “solely” of the understanding. And, I take it, what secures
the applicability of the laws of geometry to empirical objects is that in the course of
empirical intuition, we delimit the (pure) spatial form of objects. But does this mean that the
understanding generates intuitions through the act of synthesis that delimits or determines
the spatial (or spatio-temporal) form of empirical objects? How do we understand the role of
the productive imagination in empirical intuition?
This is where things get tricky. Conceptualists, even of the moderate variety, slide from the
claim that the understanding (via the productive imagination) generates the unity of
intuitions to the claim that the understanding / imagination generates intuitions (see Land,
ch. 7, p. 157). This is perhaps not a problem when what we are talking about is the
construction of intuitions in geometry, but what about in empirical intuition? Notice that in
one of the passages where Kant explicitly turns his attention to the role of the
understanding (productive imagination) in empirical intuition—the house example from §26
of the B-Deduction—he doesn’t claim that we draw the shape of a house, but that we “as it
were draw its shape” (B162). So Kant is not exactly identifying what we do in empirical
intuition with what we do in the course of pure intuition (where we do draw a figure). This
passage does not necessarily support the claim that synthesis produces or generates
intuitions.
Nonconceptualists, in other words, can read Kant as here claiming that although the shape
is already presented to us in empirical intuition, we must synthesise what is presented in
order to cognise this shape.  Again, as we have already seen, this is what it means to claim
that the understanding is an epistemic, not a constitutive condition of intuition. Such an
interpretation is not without textual and philosophical support. As Lucy Allais emphasises,
Kant repeatedly characterises the role of intuition as that of giving us objects (A19/B33,
 A50/B74, A89/B122; Allais 2009, 2015). And as Kant notes in §13 of the Deduction, the
categories, unlike the forms of space and time, “do not represent to us the conditions under
which objects are given in intuition at all” (A89/B122).
I think that nonconceptualists are right to resist the claim that the understanding and the
imagination generate or produce empirical intuitions. But—and this is important—it is a
mistake to think that they can help themselves to what is given in intuition prior to
synthesis. Christian Onof nicely diagnoses the mistake in his contribution to the volume, ‘Is




What nonconceptualists are in effect doing is implicitly relying upon the fact that objects of
experience are in place to consider some other way of accessing these same objects. Such a move
could be justified on an interpretation of Kant’s metaphysics which ignores the central Critical
move according to which fully determinate objects are not available to be picked out, but cognition
of objects involves their being determined in conformity with the transcendental conditions of
experience. (p. 218)
What I especially like about this way of putting the worry is that it also gives us a way of
thinking about what the understanding/imagination is doing that is more than an epistemic
condition of intuition, but which does not collapse the distinction between sensibility and
understanding by claiming that the understanding generates or produces (empirical)
intuitions. It seems to me that one of the main roles of the productive imagination in
empirical intuition is to delimit and determine the boundaries of an object (and that this is
what Kant means when he says that we “as it were” draw shapes in empirical intuition).
There is simply no determinate fact of the matter about what shape the “object” has before
synthesis, because no object has been differentiated. Subtracting from the work of the
understanding (imagination) in this respect is to smuggle in, as Onof puts it, a “residual
Strawsonian realism” (p. 219). We know that the laws of geometry will apply to empirical
objects because the same rules of synthesis to which we appeal in geometrical
constructions govern the delimitation of the spatial form of objects.
Although he does not think that empirical intuition presents a determinate object prior to
synthesis, Onof nevertheless thinks that prior to synthesis “we are conscious of particulars
defined through patterns of sameness and difference in space, without being conscious of
them as distinct” (p. 220). Onof characterises this as the perceptual cognition of things, or
PCT for short. This is not cognition in the normal sense (which requires conceptually-guided
synthesis), but a weaker form of ‘cognition’ that results from the mere apprehension and
reproduction of the manifold as guided by empirical laws of association. A creature that
enjoyed PCT could thus make distinctions in navigating its environment by responding to
these patterns of sameness and difference, without being conscious of particulars as
distinct. Onof appeals to PCT not only to explain animal consciousness (and even aspects of
human consciousness), but also thinks that it has an important role to play in explaining the
way that inclinations can influence human behaviour in the practical sphere without our
awareness of them. It can thus explain why we can never be sure that we are acting out of
duty. Even if we have ruled out the influence of inclinations of which we are aware, there
may always be inclinations that unconsciously influence us.
One point that comes out of Onof’s discussion is that if we want to isolate a contribution of
sensibility that is wholly independent of the understanding, it can at most play a
subpersonal role. It may be useful to do so, for example, in the kinds of contexts that Onof
has in mind—explaining non-human animal behaviour and even some human behaviour—
but it is worth noting that the nonconceptual content that Kant is primarily interested in is
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that which must be available to the judging subject. For example, the synthetic judgements
of mathematics are grounded in constructions in intuition. These constructions make spatial
content available that is not ‘contained’ in the concepts. This content is and must be
available to the judging subject, but it is also content that is only available insofar as she has
constructed the concept in intuition. Thus, it is not independent of the understanding. But
the role of the understanding in ‘actualising’ this content—to borrow Land’s phrase—does
not render the content conceptual (or at least not fully so).
There is another domain in which nonconceptual content must be available to the judging
subject, namely, in aesthetic judgements. In his contribution to the volume, ‘Kant’s Aesthetic
Nonconceptualism’ (Chapter 6), Dietmar Heidemann appeals to Kant’s account of aesthetic
judgements in the Third Critique to argue that Kant is a nonconceptualist. This is because
the determining ground of a judgement of taste is nonconceptual, namely, an aesthetic
feeling. This feeling is not just a nonconceptual state, according to Heidemann, but has
nonconceptual representational content, where what it represents is “the harmonious
relation of the understanding and imagination” (p. 130). There is, of course, a debate in the
scholarly literature concerning whether aesthetic feeling is representational, and I won’t
weigh in on that debate here.
It is worth noting, however, that even if we think that judgements of beauty depend on
nonconceptual feelings that represent the state of mind of the subject, this is not the kind of
nonconceptual content at stake in the recent debate, which concerns whether intuitions
have nonconceptual content. It might be worth thinking, however, not just about the
nonconceptual aesthetic feeling involved in aesthetic judgements, but also about the kind of
intuitive content that gives rise to the harmonious free play of the faculties on which these
judgements are grounded.
So where does all this leave us with respect to the question of whether nonconceptualism is
compatible with the Transcendental Deduction? This will obviously depend on how one
construes nonconceptualism and how one construes Kant’s goal in the ‘second step’ of the
B-Deduction. But I do think there is at least one way of reading the Transcendental
Deduction that acknowledges both that the categories do not generate or produce empirical
intuitions and that they are more than merely epistemic conditions of intuition (because
they—in particular the mathematical categories—first constitute any determinate relation to
an object in empirical intuition by first delimiting the boundaries of the object).
3. The Nature and Role of Intuitions
Throughout this review, I have been talking about the content of intuitions. This is because
much of the debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpreters of Kant has
been framed in terms of the representational content of intuition. That is, the central
question was whether the representational content of intuition was conceptual or
nonconceptual.
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Colin McLear, in a recent paper (2016) and in his contribution to this volume, ‘Getting
Acquainted with Kant’ (Chapter 8), however, denies that intuitions have content (of either the
conceptual or nonconceptual variety). To say that a state has content is to say that it has
correctness conditions, that it represents the world correctly or incorrectly. For McLear,
intuitions are not representational states, instead, and in line with Allais (2015), he suggests
that intuitions are relational states, where a relational perceptual state directly presents the
environment to the perceiver (such that the objects in one’s environment partially constitute
the state).
To get at the difference between these views, consider your perception of one of the books
on your desk. If I were to swap it with an identical copy, a representationalist (leaving aside
those who subscribe to object-dependent variants of the view) would say that your
perceptual state is the same, because it has the same content, but a relationist would deny
this. Although the two states are subjectively indistinguishable, they are nevertheless
different, because in each state you perceive a different book (this follows from the claim
that the objects themselves partially constitute the state). Notice that for the relationist,
there is no intermediary (e.g. a representation) between you and the objects you perceive.
The perceptual state in question thus cannot be characterised in terms of correctness
conditions. Through this state one is simply aware of one’s environment.
So why think that intuitions are relational states? They cannot be representational,
according to Mclear, because Kant denies that intuitions have correctness conditions. Here,
McLear has in mind Kant’s claim that “truth and illusion are not in the object insofar as it is
intuited, but in the judgment about it insofar as it is thought” (A293/B350; McLear 2016).
One way to read this passage is that Kant is simply reiterating the early modern view of
judgement as the act of affirming or rejecting some content (what we would now call a
proposition). But, as McLear notes, Kant also uses the term ‘judgement’ to refer to the
cognitive act whereby we first generate judgmental content. Synthesis, for McLear, is
precisely the act through which concepts “are brought together to form truth-bearing
contents” (p. 174) in judgements. For the relationist, it is thus at the level of judgements that
we have representational content.
The biggest problem for this view is that it is not well-suited to explain pure intuitions or to
explain the connection between pure and empirical intuitions that secures the application
of geometry to empirical objects. Pure intuitions are not relational states.  This is true of the
pure forms of intuition (as all-encompassing wholes, which are not objects for Kant) as well
as of the pure intuitions of determinate spaces and times in geometry. In the latter case, the
relationist could respond by saying that when we are doing geometry, we are representing
the form of empirical objects, while in empirical intuition, we are simply presented with the
form of objects (along with their other features). But I do not think this accords with Kant’s
argument in the Axioms of Intuition. According to Kant, what secures the applicability of
geometry to empirical objects is that “the synthesis of spaces and times, as the essential
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form of all intuition, is that which at the same time makes possible the apprehension of the
appearance” (A166/B207). Another way to put the worry is that, as Land argues, sensible
synthesis (what Kant is here referring to as “the synthesis of spaces and times”) while it may
involve judgements, is distinct from the act of judgement. In geometry, for example, the
result of sensible synthesis is an intuition. And, as I have already suggested, although we do
not produce empirical intuitions, it is via sensible synthesis that we delimit the spatial form
of objects. It is not clear, in other words, how the relationist can accommodate sensible
synthesis.
A further dimension of the debate between relationists and representationalists concerns
the role of intuitions in establishing real possibility and thus satisfying the modal condition
on cognition. The modal condition is as follows:
Necessarily, S cognizes an object O only if S is in a position to prove the real possibility of an
object possessing the features constituting the content of the representation of O. (McLear, p. 189)
The purported advantage of relationism is that because intuitions are object-dependent,
they can prove the real possibility of objects by way of the actuality of these objects (since
objects are partial constituents of the intuition). Of course, because some versions of
representationalism are also object-dependent, the real distinction here is between object-
dependent and object-independent interpretations of intuition, which are the subject of Anil
Gomes and Andrew Stephenson’s contribution ‘On the Relation of Intuition to Cognition’
(Chapter 3). Object-Dependent (OD) views hold that “necessarily, if there exists an intuition i
of some object, o, then o exists”, while Object-Independent (OID) views deny this (p. 55).
Gomes and Stephenson endorse the modal condition on cognition and, crucially, they
assume that “bringing an intuition under a concept suffices for cognition” (p. 61). From this,
it follows that the OID and OD views offer different accounts of the nature of cognition and
the role that intuition plays in proving real possibility. The set of objects one can cognise on
the OID view is larger, and so, too, is the set of really possible objects. The explanation for
this is that on the OID view, formal possibility is either identical to or entails real possibility.
Since a hallucination of an object accords with the formal conditions of experience (the
categories and space and time), it suffices to prove real possibility. Indeed, only the OID
view can account for the real possibility of non-actual objects (p. 69). The set of things one
can cognise on an OD view is obviously more restricted. Furthermore, as we have seen with
McLear’s view, (empirical) intuitions put one in a position to prove real possibility by way of
actuality. The OD view, as Gomes and Stephenson note, collapses the “(extensional)
distinction between the really possible and the actual” (p. 71).
I do not have settled views about this debate (and, I should note that Gomes and
Stephenson are primarily interested in laying out the implications of each view of intuition,
rather than with defending a particular view). But I do have two sketchy worries.
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First, it is not clear to me that the OID view has to take (most) hallucinations as establishing
real possibility. Keep in mind that for Gomes and Stephenson, “bringing an intuition under a
concept suffices for cognition” (p. 61). But to bring an intuition under a concept is to make a
judgement. And a hallucination as of a pink elephant need not lead to the judgement “That
is a pink elephant”. In other words, that the concepts <pink> and <elephant> occur to me in
the course of my hallucination does not mean that I subsume this representation under the
concept <elephant>, although I might. Perhaps a better example is the hallucination as of a
flying elephant. It is precisely because I know that elephants cannot fly that I’m not going to
make the judgement “That is a flying elephant”.
Another way to put this point is that when we subsume intuitions under concepts, we do so
against the backdrop of our understanding of the system of concepts and empirical laws
that are in place. The cognition (judgement) might still be false, for example, if, I mistakenly
apply the concept <gold> to fool’s gold. We can thus maintain the distinction between
cognition and knowledge, while recognising that there is more to cognition than just
applying any old concept to any old intuition.
McLear cites a passage in which Kant claims that the possibility of empirical concepts must
be “grounded in experience and its known laws” (A123/B270; McLear, p. 191). While McLear
is certainly right that more than formal possibility is required to establish the real possibility
of empirical concepts, what is doing the work here is experience as comprehensively
systematised in empirical laws, not the object-dependence of intuition. Furthermore, since
the relationist admits that a relational perceptual state is subjectively indistinguishable from
a hallucination, she is in the same position as the representationalist. That is, she cannot
appeal to her perceptual state in order to determine whether she is having an intuition or
merely hallucinating; she can only appeal to how well this state coheres with what she
knows about how the empirical world in fact works. Again, elephants cannot fly, so if I have
a (re)presentation of a flying elephant, I judge that it is a hallucination.
4. Some Final Remarks
The debate between conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpreters of Kant has loomed
large in recent years, and will undoubtedly continue to do so. One reason for this is that
although this way of framing the debate—“Is Kant a conceptualist or nonconceptualist?”—is
relatively new, the underlying question is not. This is the question of how to make sense of
the distinction between sensibility and understanding that is at the heart of Kant’s Critical
philosophy. Kant is committed both to the claim that sensibility and understanding are
different faculties with different roles to play in cognition and to the claim that these
faculties must work together to produce cognition. Although the debate between
conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpreters may not be settled anytime soon, engaging
with it promises increased insight into Kant’s Critical philosophy, a point to which the essays
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[1] See for example Messina (2014), McLear (2015), and Onof & Schulting (2015).↩
[2] An important difference between Schulting and Allais is that Schulting denies that intuitions secure reference to particularsprior to any involvement of the categories (see Schulting, p. 232n.7).↩
[3] Golob draws a distinction between nonconceptualism about animals (NCA) and nonconceptualism about humans (NCH).But I do not think this distinction helps on this point. If we grant that concept-guided synthesis is required to introduce certainrelations into intuition in the first place, then we must deny that any creature that cannot synthesise in accordance withconcepts is presented with these relations on the Kantian account.↩
[4] They thus want to draw a distinction between empirical intuition, which is prior to any act of synthesis, and perception,which is the product of synthesising what intuition (re)presents in such a way that it is available for cognition. See Allais(Chapter 1, p. 6) and Golob (Chapter 2, p. 51) for discussion of this distinction.↩
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